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INTRODUCTION.
The ?following article is a discussion of the constitution-
ality of Section 29 of the NEW YORK LIQUOR TAX LAW ; commonly
known as the "RAINES" law,named after the father of the bill.
The section in question declares substantially,that when one
is known to be selling liquor without a license,that the
District Attorney,or County Treasurer shall make a motion
before an Equity courtfor an order to have the one so selling
appear and show cause why he should not be enjoined. On his
failure to show cause {thich is a foregone conclusion)-,he is
enjoined personally from sellifg liquor until he pays the tax.
If he then sells without paying the tax,he is to be brought
before the Court and sentenced for eontempt.
It is claimed that this mode of procedure contravenes
Article I Section 2 of the New York State Constitution: "In
ai.l cases where the jury trial was had heretofore it shall
remain inviolate forever
The question thus arises,whether the legislature,in declaring
that an offenceformerly criminalshall be tried in an Equity
courthas overstepped the bounds set by the Constitution.
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CHAPTER I
RIGHT OF JURY TRIAL UNDER THE CLAUSE
"AS HERETOFORE EXISTING"
The right of trial by Jury is secured to the people in the
United States Courts by the Federal Constitution,and all the State
Constitutions have provisions relating thereto. Although the
phraseology varies in the different states,still the vital part
of each is practically the same; that the jury triallin all its
substantial qualities,is,and remains,secured inviolately forever.
The New York Constitution (Art. Sec.2) secures the rigit in
the following terms: "The trial by jury,in all cases where it has
been heretofore usedshall remain inviolate forever.' This word-
ing is similar' to that in most of the other statesand identical
with quite a number. Twenty-one state constitutions declare that
the right shall remain inviolate,though not stating that it shall
be "used as heretofore"'
The following is a collection of decisions in states having
provision practically identical with New York.
New Hampshire, The case of Copp v Henniker (a) held the phrase,"As
heretofore used",to refer to the provincial law as modified by the
statutes passed between 1776 and 1792. But the leading case of
(b)
King v Hopkins~held that the construction of the phrase should be
that given by Judge Parker in Pierce v State (c) ,that ,"The jury
trial intended by the Constitution was the pure and genuine jury
Ia) 55 N.H.179 at p.192
(b) 57 N.H.554
(c) 13 N.H.557.
2trial of English and American Common Law" Though the early
American judges sometimes made singular work of itit is to be
inferred,that they meant to give the parties their full Connn. ..luw
rights. Such an understanding and intention are of vastly more
weightthan the fact that they failed to give such rights,because
of their unfamiliarity with the law. And as for the judges whom
had no such intention,their rulings and decisions should have no
weight at all. They tried to decide cases not by any scientific
application of legal rules,but upon principles of "common sense and
justice' Though such a system of coming to a decision may be
satisfactory in a given caseits universal adoption would be fatal
to scientific jurisprudence. Decisions of such a nature should
be absolutely One example will show the fallacy
of construing the clause in the Constitutionto refer to the law
and procedure in the Colonies,immediately precedimg; the Revolution.
Judge Dudley was regarded,by the leading men of his time,as "The
best judge in New Hampshire! The following is one of his
charges to a jury (a), "You have heard,gentlemen of the jury,what
has been said in this case by the lawyers - the rascals ! But no,
I will not abuse them,it is their business to make a good case for
their clients. ........ But you and Igentlemen,have something
else to consider. They talk of law. Why,gentlemen, it is not law
we want,but justice.......... A clear head and an honest heart
are worth more than all the law of the lawyers......... It is our
business to do justice between the parties. Not by any quirk of the
(a) Life of Wm Plummer.
3law out of Coke or Blackstonebooks that I never read and never
will,but by common sense and common honesty,as between man and man
And Now Mr Sheriff,take out the jury; and youMr Foreman,
do not keep us waiting with idle talk, of which ther has been too.
much alreadyabout matters which have nothing to do with the case"'
The phrase,"as heretofore existing"means the common law of
England modified by American conditionsthat is,tie Common Law of
England,such parts only being excepted,as are inconsistent with the
Constitution,or not applicable to the institutions or circumstances
of this Country (a). This is the general rule (b).
In Massachusetts "as heretofore used",is construed to mean,
as at Common Law (c).
In Maine it is held that a Court Martial trial does not
necessarily include a hearing before a jury,as such Courts did not
have juries at common law.(d)., In Coffin v Coffin(e) the Court
stat.,ed that,"The case does not come within the clause of the Con-
stitutionas the practice has been otherwise at Common Law"
In Pennsylvania it was stated,in Emeric v Harris (f),that the
legislature cannot impose any provisions substantially restrictive
of the right of trial by jury. So,although a law has been passed,
giving power to a justice to hold trial in certain cases without
a jury,still such law was constitutional,as it covered only cases
(a) 66 N.H.53 p.72. (b) Cooley Const.Lim. #32-34. (c) Charles
River Bridge v Warren4Bridge"7 Pick.365. Stockbridge Iron Co.
v Hudson Co.102 Mass.4 p.48 Howe v Cambridge 114 Mass 390
Bigelow v Bigelow,120 Mass 320 p.321. Davis v Davis 123 Mass
590 at p.593. Cd) Ranson v Brown 18 Me. 16 p.218. 25 Me.488
(e) 55 .Me 361 p.362. Saco v Wentworth 37 Me 156 p.172 Randall v
Kehlor 60 Me 43 p 44 Dun v Burleigh 62 Me 24 p.37.
(f) 1 Binney (Pa) 416,p.424.
4which had been so tried at common law(a).
In Illinois,the constitution of 1870(b) declares,"The right of
trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate" But
in the two preceding Constitutions the section reads simply,"Shall
remain inviolate(c). Thus the Constitution of 1870 refers to th
right as existing under the preceding eonstitutions,which did not
contain "as heretofore",so that Illinois cannot be brought into the
group of states having the clause "as heretofore used"
Maryland. State v Buchanan (d) declares,"Our ancestors
brought with them the Common Law of England,and to their judicial
decisions we are to look for the evidences of that law." " ' As
heretofore use4,' refers to the common law of England before the
Revolution (e).
In Delaware,State v Williams(f) holds that,"the common law
obtains in America,where it suits our conditionand nothing in the
Constitution prohibits it."
Missouri. "The general rule of constructionln reference to
this provision of the constitution,is that any act,which destroys o1
to
materially impairs the right of trial by juryaccording the course
of the common law,in cases proper for cognizance by a juryis un-
constitutional. (g)
(a) In Matter of Pennsylvanian Hall,5 Pa St.204. p.208 Trimbles
Appeal, 6 Watts 133. (b) Const.Art 2 Sec.5. (c) Const.of 1818,
Art 13 Sec 6; Const.of 1818 Art 8 Sec 6. (d) 5 H.& J 317. p 356
Ce) Dashiel v Atty Gen.5 H.&c J 392. p 401; 2 Md 429 p 452; 16
Md.549 p.555 (i) 9 Houst 508 at p 525 (g) State v Vail 53 Mo
97 p 107. See also Smith's Adifrs' v Smith 1 How (Miss) 102
p.105. Lewis v Garret's Aikmr 5 How (Miss) 453. Littleton v
Fritz 65 Ia 488 p.491.
5In New York State the decisions hold practically the same way as
in the other states. The cases under this clause in New Yor ,
will be treated of in the next chapter in connection with those dis-
cussing the right of jury trial in criminal cases arising under the
liquor laws.
6CHAPTER I I
JURY TRIAL IN CRIMINAL CASES
UNDER THE LIQUOR LAWS.
Numerous cases can be found covering the point at issue,namely:
that a jury trial was a matter of right,under the Constitutionin
all cases of misdemeanor,especially for the illegal sale of intoxi-
cating liquor.
In People v Kennedy(a) we find the following,"It is declared by
the Constitution of this State (Atr.l Sec.2) 'the trial by juryin
all cases where it has been heretofore usedshall remain inviolate
forever! The obvious meaning of the expression 'heretofore used',
isin use at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. What
is meant by this expression,'trial by jury' ? Does it mean a
comrmon law jury of twelve men,or a jury of six men,as provided if
the trial at Special Sessions ? I thinkV there can be no doubt
on this point. If the legislature may reduce a jury in number
to sixthey have the same right to reduce it in number to oneand
thus make a jury of one a compliance with the requirements of the
Constitution. The Constitution secures a jury of twelve menwhose
verdict is to be unanimous (See Hudson v River Ry Co v Cruger,2 Ker.-
nan 198; State v Cox 5 Sm. & Mar.664; 3 Peters 446-7; 4 Wheat.242-3-
4.) If,therefore,the accused,in an offence of this grade,had a
(a) 2 Park 312 p.137
7right to a trial by jury,when the Constitution took effecthis
right cannot be taken away by subsequent act of the legislature.
It is no answer to say that his offence did not exist at the time
the Constitution ttook effect,but has since been created by statute.
If the offence be such that it would have been entitled to a trial
by juryif created before the Constitution was adoptedit cannot
be deprived of the same right when created afterwards. Any other
view wdldcinable the legislature to create ajnew offence and call
it a felonymake it triable in a court of Special Sessionsand pun-
ishable by death. If you deny the constitutional contrQl over
new as well as old offencesyou make the power of the legislature
omnipotent,and have no protection against its despotism. The
true rule undoubtedly is.,that when the legislature creates a new
offence it is placed on the same footing with other previous offen-
ces of the same gradeand is equally governed by the provisions
of the Constitution. Selling liquor without a licence was then
(1 R.S.628 Sec.25),as now,declared~a misdemeanorbut it could only
be tried on indictment and by a full jury"
Under the "Raines" law (Sec.34),any one who shall neglect or
refuse to make application for certificate,or give the bond,or pa
the tax iposed4,as required by this act,is guilty of a misdemeanor.
By another section all misdemeanors,under the Act,are to be tried
in a Oourt of Record having jurisdiction over crimes of the grd
of felonies. Selling liquor without a license has always been a
misaemeanor and triable only after indictment. The present law
expressly declares it to be a misdemeanor,and that all misdemeanors
8shall be tried in a Court having jurisdiction over felonies. But
Sec."29" provides a method whereby equity takes cognizance of an
act criminal in its nature and after hating enjoined the personnot
the act,on a further breach of the law,proceeds to punish summarily
an act of a purely criminal character.
People v Johnson.(a) was a case of petition for a writ of habeas
corpus to enquire into the cause of his detention. The petitioner
had been arrested for violation of the liquor law,taken before a
magistratewhere he was refused a jury trtal. It was held:" The
right of trial by jury is what the prisoner claims .... There has
been no one subject which'has been so jealously guardedand so uni-
formly lauded since the date of the celebrated Magna Charta,as the
common law right to a trial by jury .... As the Constitution,which
is the fundamental law -the permanent will of the majority- declares
that 'the trial by jury in all cases,where it has been heretofore
used shall remain inviolate forever',the legislature is prohibited
from depriving a person accused of a criminal oefence,of the right
of a trial by such jury, The law in reference to an examination
applicable to other cases of miademeanoris alike applicable to
offences for selling liquor without a license"
With regard to legislative attempts to create new offencesand
put them in a special class,the case of Wood v City of Brooklyn(b)
is very pertinent. "Section 2 of Article I of the Constitution
relates to classes,an,of course'includes the individual cases which
(a) 2 Park.322. p.325,
(b) 14 Barb.425, p.432.
9they comprise. In no other way can constitutional enactments
preserve that comtinued efficacy,which is so essential for the pub-
liec goo*. Whenevertherefore,a new case is added to a class,it
becomes subject to its rules. To allow the legislature to except
from the operation of a constitutional provisionby direct enact-
menta matter clearly falling within its meaning,would sanction a
fraud upon its organic lawand might,in the end,destroy its obli"-
gation"
If the offence of selling liquor without a licence is identical
with the offence at common law,then it is triable by juryand the
person charged is entitled to a jury trial.(a)
-Nor can an Equity Court assume jurisdiction to try cases of a crim-
inal nature,,.i In the case of Kramer v The Board of Police of
New York (b),Kramer sought to restrain the Board of Police by an
injunction in Equity from arresting him for selling wines etc.,in
the lobbies of places of amusement. Such sales of liquors were
made misdemeanors by statute. Kramer had requested the Court
below to grant the injunction,on the ground that his act was not
in violation of the statute. "The Court below held the plaintiff
not guilty of a crimethus trying in a Court of Equity the guilt
or innocence of a person accused of a crime on affidavit. The ten-
dency has been to greatly extend the remedy of injunction in civil
cases,but certainly such remedy should be limited to civil cases,and
criminal cases left to the disposition of the criminal courts"'
(a) Warren v People 3 Park 544. p.551. Behan v people 3 Park 680.
People v Stevens 13 Wend.341. 4 N.Y.Crim.R.548. 2 Cowen's Crim.
R 433.
(b) 4 N.Y.Crim R 551
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In Davis v American Society &c (a),the Court declares very
clearly and concisely,that equity must keep its hands off criminal
matters. The Court holds as follows: "Hence it cannot be dis-
puted that Bergli was acting under a valid law,and regular authority
and he had the right to make the threatened arrests,if the plain-
tiffs were actually engaged in violating the law to prevent cruelty
to animals. The only question for %contestation*v,,as whet1h r,as-.a
matter of factithey were guilty or innocent of such violation; and
the determination of the question could not,by such an action as
thisbe drawn into a court of equity. Whether a person accuded
of a crime,be guilty-or innD3ent,is to be determined in a common
law court by a jury; and the people,as well as the accused,have
the right to have it thus determined. If this action in this case,
then it could in every case of a person accused of a crime,where the
same serious consequences would follow an arrest; and the trial of
offendersin the constitutional mode prescribed by law,could for-
ever be prohibited"
In Hill v People(b) we find the following:- "But our laws (organic
as well as statute) exempt persons,charged with criminal offences,
from coercive summary trials without a jury. Our State constitu-
tion provides that the jury trial shall remain inviolate in all
cases where it has been heretofore used. Under the laws existing
at the adoption of the constitution,a justice could hold a court
(a) 75 N.Y.362
(b) 20 N.Y.366,p 368.
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of Special Sessionsand could try certain cases,but if proper secur-
ity was given,the culprit must be tried at a court of Oyer ard
Terminer or General Sessions,where they could not be tried without
indictment,not* by any except a common law jury of twelve men."
Such must be the rule and such must -be the rights of persons charged
with misdemeanors now. They have the right to have the complaint
exhibited before them,for any crime or misdemeanor,examined and
passed upon by a grand jury,before they can be coerced into a trial,
and if indicted to be tried by a jury of twelve men.
(a)
In People v Killeen, the clarter of the city of Yonkers gave the
city judge power to try excise cases. The relator was arrested
for a- violation of the excise law. He pleaded *Not Guilty",and
demanded a jury trialbut the court refused it. It was held that
selling intoxicating liquors in violation of law,was an offence
triable by jury when the constitution was adopted. "The term 'cases
in Art Isec.2,is used in a generic sense; it embraces grades or
clasesnot individual or particular cases,except as they make up
a class. The intent of the constitution was to preserve the
right as amply as it was enjoyed at the time of its-,adoption"
It has been uniformly held that the sale of intoxicating liquor
without a license is a ctiminal offenceand punishable as such.
In the case of People v Charbineau( )the Court so held in the follow-
ing language: "The learned counsel for the defendant contends t1at
T(a) 11 Hun.289 p 290
(b) 115 N.Y.433 p.4356.
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a sale without a -license is not a criminal offence. But for more
than thirtY.:: years (17 N.Y.516),the courts,construing the Acthave
held such sales to be crimes; and that construction *hich is in
harmony with the previous laws on the same subject,which is in
accordance with the common understanding,and which has been acquies-
ced in by the legislatureshould prevail.41 It has been held ever
since that such an indictment charges a crime!'
In this connection it may be well to take a glance into the
construction of the Court of special Sessionsand the'right of
trial by jury therein.
By the present constitution,offences of the grade of misdem-
eanors may be tried by a Court of Special sessionsin any case
where the legislature so directs (Const.1896,Art 6.Sec.23). This
section is the same as sec.26 of Art.6 of Constitution of 1870,
which was the first amendment to give a court of special Sessions
that power. At first glance it would look as though these
sections abrogated the right of trial by juryin all cases where
the legislature saw fit so to do.
The first Actauthorizing the trial of petty offences by a
Court of Special Sessionscomposed of three justices,was passed
by the New York Colonial Legislatureseptember 1,1744. Jurisdiction
was there given over "misdemeanors,breaches of the peace,and other
criminal offences,under the degree of grand larceny"' The same
(a) 1 Smith & Livingston 339
Van Shai ck, 240"
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power was continued after the Revolutionby the Act of March 24th,
1787 (a) Various modifications and amendments were adopted at
different times until 1824,when a jury was authorized to be summoned
on application of-the accused (b) Tbe constitutional amendment,
empowering the legislature to grant courts of Special Sessions
jurisdiction over all offences of the grade of misdemeanors was
enacted in 1870. ,For the forty-six years immediately preceding
the amendment,juries of six men had been allowed in Courts of
Special Sessionsso that when the people gave the legislature power
to increase the jurisdiction of such courtsthey did it with the
understanding that the court should remain practically of the same
natute. Certainly it cannot be presumed that the people have
given up their right of trial by jury in :&ll cases of misdemeanorin
the discretion of the legislature. Howeverthe people by giving
a Court of Special sessions with a jury of six menthe authority to
try misdemeanors,did not "ipso facto",give the legislature the power
to declare that misdemeanors shall be tried in an I quity Court.
The Court of Special sessions is a criminal courtand can take cot-
nizance of all misdemeanors falling within its jurisdiction; but an
Equity court has authority only over civil matters and cannot try
the criminality of an offence. Selling liquor without a license
*is,and always has been,a misdemeanor,a criminal offence; and demand-
int as such,a criminal trial.
The question to be decided by the Equity court,under sec."29"
(a) 1 Greenleaf,424.
(b) Session Laws of 1824,297 #47.
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of the present law,is one merely of the guilt or innocence of the
#efendant. The court is asked,first,to decide whether or not the
defendant is selling liquor without a license. As such a sale is
declaredby Section 34,to be a misdemeanotthe determination of this
question involves merely the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
He is then enjoined from further commission of the said crime. It
is not the place of business,but the person,who is enjoined. ThUs
it is restraining the commission of a crime,pure and simple. Who
is enjoined ? The person. The nuisance is not the personbut the
place. But the injunction runs against the person ene alldnd is
binding on him in all places and at all times. It would appear,
thereforethat the legislature not only grants the Equity courts
jurisdiction in criminal cases,but also compels the Court to use
its extraordinary remedies and powers in a given case. It has al-
ways been the general understanding that Equity would use its extra-
ordinary power only in cases where the law was powerless or insuf-
ficient to grant full relief. The Equity judge always used his
discretion in the matter; first,as to whether the legal remedy
really was inadequate,and, second,as to whether the case was one
deserving equitable relief. The present law overthrows this
theory entirelyleaves no discretion intthe Courtand compels it
to act whire there is no excuse for equitable interference,and even
goes so far as to direct the court to take cognizance of a purely
criminal offence.
15
CHAPTER I I I
INJUNCTION REMEDY IN NUISANCE CASES.
It is set up in defence of the section under discussion, that
the act enjoined is a nuisanceand therefore cognizable in an
Equity court.
A common nuisance is an offence against the publicby doing
injuries to all the people generally; or by omitting to do that
which tthe common good requires.
The remedies for nuisance are twofold
I. Prevenhtive
(a) Abate
(b) Indict
(c), Enjoin.
I I.Cpensatory
Action for damages.
Public (or common) nuisances,with all their constituent facts
are public offencesand Equity may,in some casestake jurisdiction
to suppress them; but only when no adequate remedy at law exists.
The legal remedy of indictment is always adequate,in a case of the
illegal sale of liquor,except where irreparable injury is threatenedk
The mere sale never causes irreparable injury to the public at larg@
and indictment should therefore be sufficient. In cases of nuis-
ance,only such remedy will be granted as is necessary to eliminate
16
the nuisance and nothing further,as the court interferes only to
Stop the nuisance and not to punish the offender.
The ordinary remedyand the one which is usually deemed suffi-
cientis Abatement; in respect to which numerous cases are to be
found.
Brown v Perkins declares that "Spirituous liquors are not of them-
selves a common nuisance,but the act of keeping them for sale,may
be made such by statute. The only legal method to stop it,is
the one directed by statutefor t1 seizure by warrantbringing
them before a magistrateand giving the owner of the property an
opportunity to defend his right to it. As it is the use of the
buildingor the keeping of spirituous liquors in itwhich in general
constitutes the nuisance,the abatement consists in putting a stop
to such use (a)
A statute declaring places,in which intoxicating liquor is
illegally sold or kept for sale,to be conmon nuisances,does not
authorize the destruction of such buildings by private individuals
or by the public authorities. The abatement of a nuisance,caused
by the illegal use of a buildingconsists in the prevention of the
future illegal useand not in the destruction of the building(b).
Under the guise of exercising the power of summary abatement
of nuisances,the legislature cannot take into its own hands the en-
forcement of the criminal or quasi criminal law(c).
In Fisher v McGirr Cd) Chief Justice haw makes use of the
(a) 15 Gray,89 (b) State v Paine,5 R.I.185,Ames,C.J. Taunton v
Steele,119 Mass 237,and cases there cited. (c) Taunton v Stee~l.
(d) 1 Gray 1 p.2 6.
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following language: "Suppose the object to beto prevent and punish
possession of intoxicating liquor ... There seems to be two
distinct modes or courses of proceedingboth well known to the law,
but of considerable difference in their modes of operation; they
area proceeding in rem,by the sequestration of the property or
thing,which is noxious in itselfor made the instrument or subject
of a noxious and injurious use; The other,a proceeding in personaa,
for the punishment of the person of the offenderas an example to
deter others from the commission of a like offence. Both are pro-
ceedings designated for the enforcement of the criminal law,and must
be governed by the rules applicable to its administration"
These few cases will show the theory on which the courts pro-
ceed in dealing with cases of nuisance;namely,to abate only the use
which constitutes the nuisance,and thus eliminate the nuisance
entirely. The maintaining of certain nuisances is criminal,and
subjects the one maintaining them,to indictment. It might be
well tp mention a few cases under this head.
A
"The remedy for abating a public nuisance is by indictmentand
not by removing it by forcewithout legal proceedings finding It
to be a nuisance of that character'(a) Upon conviction of a
nuisance,the court may punish by fine only,or they may also cause
the nuisance to be abated (b) The order of abatement is no part
of the punishment,and issues,not as a matter of course,a~ter indict-
menit,but such indictment forms the basia of the order of abatement(cl
(a) Earpvv Lee,71 Ill 193. (b) Waring v Mayer,24 Ala 701.
Droneberber v State,112 Ind.105. State v Dudley 30 Me 65.
(c) Buzzard v State 25 0h. St.536 Shepard v People,40 Mich 187.
18
An individual cannot abate a common nuisance; the remedy being by
indictment(a). Relief babatement or indictment beinC present,
the court will not grant an injunction (b). If neither abatement
or indictment are found to be sufficientthe remedy of injunction
may be used.
The earliest cases of injunction to restrain a common nuisance
were those relating to purprestures,namely,the enclosing of that
which should be left open as belonging to the public.• In the early
case of Attorney General v Richards (c),the court enjoined any
further erection of structures between high and low water marks in
ports,mouths of harbors etc,and decreed that thos already erected
should be abated.
The earliest case was in the reign of Elizabeth. An informatio1
was filed by the Attorrey-General to restrain the erection of a
pidgeon house,by a tenant for years,of a parcel of a manor,the
reversion of which was in the Queen. The court being of opinion
that a pidgeon house was a common nuisance an injunction was granted
(d). There was of course no valid ground for granting this in-
junction,but it shows very clearly the antiquity of the jurisdiction
in such matters. In 1752,in the case of Baines v Baker(e),a motion
for an injunction to stay the building of a house to inoculate for
small-pox,was5 denied,the Chancellor saying: "Bills to restrain
nuisances must be extended tQ such only as are nuisances at law,.
a)sttev Pane,5 R.I.185 State v Kernan 5 R.I.4977T5TPowell
v Foster,59 Ga 790. (2 Aust.603, So also Bristol Harbor Case,18
Ves.214. Cd) Eliz. Bond's CaseMo.238. (e) 3 Atk.750.
19
The proper method would be by information throught the Attorney-
General." In Attorney Gen.v Cleaver (a),Lord Eldon stated
that "Instances of the interposition of this court upon the subject
of nuisances have been confined and rare". Nor will Equity inter-
fere to stay proceedings in any criminal matter or case not strictly
of a civil nature,.
"Equity will grant an injunction to restrain a nuisance only where
it is a public one and is asked for by the Attorney General; and tb
then only after it has been tried at law; or extreme probability of
irreparable injury to the property of the plintiff or his person"
(b)
Injunction will not be granted except where irreparable injury or
danger to health would follow (c)
In our own state the leading case on this matter is Atty Gen.
v Utica Ins Co(d) Here an information was filed by the Attorney
General to obtain an injunction restraining defendant from acting
as a bank. The company was established to conduct an insurance
businessbut was assuming the powers and functions of a bank,both
of issue and discount. An act of the legislature declared anyone
subject to a fine who should become a member of any banking asso-
ciationnot authorized by law. Thus,in this casewe have a defen-
dant sought to be enjoined from pursuing a business which was ille-
gal,as to him,until he complied with the statultory regulations
relating thereto. The opinion,in the case,by the great Chancellor
fa) 18 ves.211 p.217. (b Crandler v Tinkl,9 Vs.22Eldon)
(c) Wynstanley v Lee,3 Swanst.355. Cd) 2 Johns. Ch.371.
20
Kent,is very applicable to the present case. The weight of hia
name,added to the justice of the principles therein contained,
should make the opinion the best possible authority. "Whether the
defendants have banking powers given themby the act by which they
are incorporated,is,strictly,a legal question. It is equally
a question of law whether they were within the purview of the res-
training act. I have always understood it to be a general prin-
ciple,in respect to the powers of this courtthat when a cause
depends,simply and entirelyon the solution of a dry legal ques-
tion,the proper forum for the determination of that question is a
court of law. It appears not to admit of doubt,nor do I under-
stand it to be disputed,tha$ if the defendants,as a corporation,
have assumed powers not within their charterthe people of this
state,by their Attorney Generalhave a complete and adequate remedy
at law,either by the cftmmbn.Aa1kwrit of 'quo warranto',or by an in-
formation in the nature of such writ...... If found guilty of
usurpationor unlawfully holding and executing any such office r
franchisethe Supreme Court may give judgment of ouster,and fine
the defendant for his unlawful usurpation-Land etc. Prosecutions
in the King's Bench appear to have been the established course.
Banking was formerly a common law right,but the legislature having
declared it to require a franchise; any usurpation of this privil-
ege has its adequate remedy by the public prosecutor in the Supreme
Court. I cannot find that this Court has any concurrent juris-
diction........... The restraining act itself considers the act
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of banking without legislative authority,as an offencefor which
the party offending is subject to a penalty ..... The charge
contained in the information savors,thenso much of a criminal
offence,that it would require a clear and settled practice to jus-
tify the interference of this courtwhen that interference is not
called for in aid of a prosecution at law. The charge of a usur-
pation of a franchise has,so frequently,9ccurred,and the remedy,
by injunction,so convenient and summary,that the jurisdiction of
this court would have been placed beyond all possibility of a
doubtand have been distinctly announced,by a series of presedents,
if any such general jurisdiction existed. But I have searched,
in vain,for this authentic evidence of such power. The precedents
are all in the writ of King's Benchand 'Kyd' cites nearly a hun-
dred instanceswithin the-last centuryof informations filed in
the King's Bench to call in question the exercise of a franchise.
(So also with the present "Raines" law. Injunction toenforce
payment of license would have been an easy method,but we find no
such exercise of the equity power. On the other hand,we seein-
deed,hundreds of cases where failure to pay such tak has been the
foundation of suits in the law courts,and usuallyif not always,in
criminal actions).If the charge be of a criminal nature,or an ofen-
ce against the public,and does not touch the enjoyment of property,
it ought not to be brought within the direct jurisdiction of this
court,which was intended to deal only in matters of civil right,
resting in Equity,or where the remedy at law was not sufficiently
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adequate. Nor ought the process of injunction be applied but
with the utmost caution. It, is' the strong arm of the court; and
to render its operation benign and usefulit must be exercised
with great discretion,and only when necessity requires it. Assum-
ing the charges in the information to be trueit does not appear
to me that the banking power,in this caseproduces such imminent
and great mischief to #he community,as to call for this summary
remedy.
The English Court of Chancery rarely uses this processexcept
where the~right is first established at lawor the exigency of the
case renders it indispensable . . .... I know that the Court is
in the habit of restraining private nuisances to property,and of
quieting persons in.the enjoyment-of private right; but it is an
extremely rare caseand may be considered,if it ever happenedas
an anomoly,for a Court of equity to interfere at all,and mud less
preliminarily,by injunction,to put down a public nuisance wkich did
not violate the.right of roperty,but only contravened the general
policy.... This information proceeds against the defendant
for a mere usurpation of power belonging to the government alone,
or to itsspsecial grantees . . . The plain state of the case
then isthat information is here filed by the Attorney General to
red~ress and restrain by injunction, the usurpation of a franchise
which, if true,amouints to a breach of law,and of publc policy. I
may venture to say that such a prosecution is without precedent in
this court,but it is suprted by a thousand precedents in a court
of law. The whole question,upon the merits,is one of law,and
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not of equity. The charge is too much of the nature of a misde-
meanor to belong to this court. The process of injunction is too
peremptory and powerful in its effects to be used in such a case as
this~without the clearest sanction. I shall best consult the
utility and stability of the powers of this courtby not stretching
them beyond the limits prescribed by the precedentsU
It seems that the above case is analogous to the one under dis-
cusgion,both in points of resemblance and in similarity of reason-
ing. Both are statutory wrongs; but neither is declared a nuis-
ance. Both are offences against the people as a wholeand are
prosecuted in the name of the people,but neither does any great
damage to the public at large,as both may be lawful by a precedent
compliance with certain formal rules,or payment of a money con-
sideration. Nor is either inherently dangerousas it is not the
act itself which constitutes the offence,but merely the lack of a
nominAl sanction,granted on the payment of money or compliance
with formal rules.
Village of Brockport v Johnston (a) was an action by the
Village of Brockport to restrain defendant,Johnstonfrom erecting
wooden structures within limits forbidden by the by-laws of the
village. The village was authorized to make such lawsunder an
Ac of the Legislature. It was held that t"equity will not inter-
fere by injunction to enforce a penal ordinance,unless the 'act
sought to be restrained is,in itself,a nuisance':
(a) 13 Abb.N.C.468.
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Round Lake Association v Kellog (a). In this case the defendant
asked relief from an order of injunctionrestraining him in cer-
tain uses of premises leased by him for ninety-nine years. Plain-
tiff claims right to fix a license fee for defendantand obtained
this injunction pending the action. It was held that as the
business is not claimed to be a nuisance,and plaintiff has shown
no great or irreparable injury to follow on continuance of the
salethat an injunction would not lie.
Attorney General v New jersey Railway~b) An information was laid to
prevent an alleged public nuisance. "It would seem,at first,in-
congruous and improper,for this court to interfere in cases of
public nuisance. The very fact that nuisances of that character
are offences against the communityand necessarily savor of crimin-
ality in a greater or less degree,would seem to distinguish them as
matters not proper to be dealt with by this court ..... In cases
of public nuisanc6 there is an undisputed jurisdiction in the
common law courts by indictment; and a court of equity ought not
to interfere in a case of misdemeanor,* h8n the object sought can
be as well attained in the ordinary tribunalS.
Thus we see in all the cases,equity refuses to enjoin unless
plaintiff shows some ground for equitable interference. In the
case of a license or privilege,between private individuals,equity
refuses to interfere unless the plaintiff shows some valid ground
for equitable jurisdiction; he is left to his remedy at law. Where
TaY) F4iN-Y S. R. 29l.
(b) 2 Green Ch.136, p.l 3 9.
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the question comes up between the state or municipality and an
individual, even in a clearly civil case,still Equity refuses to
enjoin unless an injurious nuisance be shown. And in all cases
of a criminal natureequity refuses to enjoin unless the crime be
a nuisance also,and aff~cting some individual in such a manneras
to allow him an action. But no cases can be found where offences
declared by statute to be a crime,and expressly declared to be
punishable in a court of record,having jurisdiction to punish as
for a-felonywhich hold th-at the defendant can be brought before
an Equity court,and after being proven a criminal therein,can then
be enjoined from further acts of a criminal nature.
In Mayor of Hudson v Thorne (a),Chancellor Walworth declared,
that it was no part of the business of a court of Equity,to enforce
the penal laws of the state by injunction,unless the act sought to
be restrained was a nuisance. A case bearing directly on the
point at issue is Waupun v Moore (b). It is there stated,that
a court of Equity will not enforce by injunction,a village ordin-
anceforbidding an act which is not a nuisance per se. And this
is soalthough the very terms of the ordinance,declares such to be
the proper remedy. Nor is the remedy at law inadequate,merely
because not stringent enough (c).
StorIn Parsons v Bedfrd (d),lays it down that the trial
by jury is not dependent on the form of the action,but on the real
substance as at common law. "The trial by jury is justly dear
{a)7 -P-aige 261,p 264. Cb) 34Wis. 450. C-6F33 Mic. -____
Cd) 3 Pet.433,p.4 45 .
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to the American people. It has always been an object of
deep interest and solicitudeand every encroachment on it has been
wattched with treat jealousy. One of the strongest objections,
originallj taken,against the Constitution of the United Stateswas
the want of an express provision securing the right of trial by
jury in civil cases. 'No fact once tried by a jury,shall be other-
wise reexaminable in any court of the United Statesthan according
to the rules of the common law'. By the common lawthey meant,
what the-constitution denominated in the Third Article 'law'; not
merely suits,which the common law recognized among its old and
settled proceedingsbut suits in which legal rights were to be
ascertained and determined"
Irwin v Dixon (a),was a request for an injunction. "This form of
remedy was one much questionedas permissible to the public or
individual in case of a public right of this kind invaded. And
when at last deemed allowable,it was Only whrre the commnity at
large,or some individualfelt ±nterested in having the supposed
ntisance immediately prostrated,on account of its greatcontinued,
and irreparable injury
The leading casesetting forth the rule regarding the restraining
of public nuisances by equityisCeity of Georgetown v Alexandria
Canal Co.(b) A bill was filed by plaintiff to restrain the con-
struction of an aqueduct. "Besides the remedy at law, it is now
-TT--9Howp._2"7 . See also,Osborne v U.S.Bnk,9 Wheat.840. -Edeno-n
Inj. Ch.XI; I Story Eq. Jur.25. (b) 12 Pet.9l p.98
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settledthat a court of Equity may take jurisdiction in cases of
public nuisanceby an information filed with the Attorney General.
This jurisdiction seems to have been acted on with great caution
and hesitancy.........Yet the jurisdiction has been finally
sustainedupon the principle that Equity can give more adequate
and complete relief than can be obtained at law. Whilst,therefor9
it is admitted by all that it is confessedly one of delicacyand ac-
cordingly the instances of its exercise are rare,e it may be
exercised in those cases in which there is imminent danger of
mischief before the tardiness of the law could reach it"
The other casewhere the Attorney General can get an injunctionis
whete t4e public health is threatened by a nuisance(a).
The case of In re Debs,Petitioner(b),will be treated more fully
in the next chapter,but it may be cited here as additional proof
of the rule that,"The jurisdiction of Chancery with regard to
public nuisances is founded on the irreparable damage to indi-
viduals or the great public injury likely to ensud"(p.592)
Where a delay can safely be toleratedthe usual remedy in such
cases,by or on behalf of the public,is by indictment,rather than
injunction(c).a
(a) Attorney Gen.v Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corp.133 Mass.361.
(b) 158 U.Sb. 564. Cc) 12 Pet. 98; 19 Pick.154; 2 Story's Eq. Jur.92
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It seems,thereforethat nuisances may be abated,but only after a
proper actionor in extreme cases summarily,where a statute,based
on the police power,so declares.. But even them only in a valid
exercise the Police power. An indictment may also be had in a
case of nuisance. This action is brought by the public prosecutor
in a case where the criminal law covers the facts. The remedy of
injunction may be had by a private individual where the nuisance
causes him special damage,and both the other remedies are inade-
quate,as where he fears irreparable injury. Or the public pro-
secutor may get an injunction to restrain a public nuisance,but
only where there is danger of irreparable damage to the public,or
injury to their health.
The mere sale of liquor without a licensecauses no more damage to
4n individual or to the puiblic than a sale under a license. (The
only damage to the public,in such a caseis the loss of the license
fee. This cannot be called irreparable damage) Such being the
case,(Sec."29") of the New York Liquor Tax law,is unconstitutional,
as extending the jurisdiction of Equity,without a juryto cases whe
wherein a jury trial has always been had as of right heretofore.
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CHAPTER IV
LEGISLATIVE ENCROACHMENTS ON THE RIGHT
OF
TRIAL BY JURY.
"To err is human". Every man makes a mistake or comnitts a
wrong sometime in his life; but the welfare and safety of society
demands he be punished when such wrongs assume proportions danger-
ous to the rights of others. No excuses are accepted. Every
man must be supposed to know the law. The penalties for violation
are plainly set forth. To break a law entails punishment. A
method has been adopted by the peopleby means of which,the ques-
tion of the breach is decided. This is a vital question to the
one charged withe the offence. It is a qiestion of fact,and
needs no legal learning to decide it. The decision of the people
based on centuries of trial and usage,is,that twelve menthe peers
of the accusedare the fittest to determine the qtestion. The
people having thus decidedhave placed a provision in their con-
stitutiondeclaring that,"In all cases where the jury trial was
had heretoforeit shall remain inviolate forever7 There can be
no theoretical discussions of this clause. It is an absolute
rule founded on the experience of centuries,and upheld by the
master minds of the race,as a safeguard against tyrznny. The tyrants
of the present day are not Kings ,Emperors,or Oligarchs, but
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"legislative majorities'' And in the present condition of
political combination and strifesuch majorities would be dangerous
indeed,were it not for the restrictions of the Constitution. Tie se
restrictions are the rules which govern in that border regionwhere
the power of the government,and individual liberty conflict.
Where they applythey are supreme and cannot be contravened.
Criminal acts,as existing heretofore,pure and simpledemand a jury
trial. This cannot be contested. But can a legislature de-
clare an actwhich heretofore was merely a crimeto be also a nuis-
anceand as such cognizable in a court of Equity ? Equity can
only take cognizance of a supposed nuisancewhere it is such in
fact, or has been declared so by statute. The legislature cannot
declare a thing to be a nuisance,which,in its very nature and in
facthas none of the elements of a nuisance.
Let it be granted that the legislature can prohibit a certain
traffic. Cant'.. regulate it ? Certainly,because it may pro-
hibit it. But could the legislature prohibit it arbitrarilyby
the use of some cruel or unusual method ? If notthencan the
traffic be fegulatedso that a breach of a rule entails some cruel
or unusual punishment ? No,the procedure in such cases must be
by due process of law. The legislature may declare that the sale
of liquor without a license to be a misdemeanor,as it has always
been; but it is unconstitutional to decree that such misdemeanor
shall be punished by contempt proceedings in an Equity court. The
act of selling liquor without a license,is either a criminal or
a civil wrong. If it be criminal then Equity has no jurisdiction,
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in the absence of danger of irreparable damage. If it be a civil
wrong,it is against the people onlyand is theAmount of the tax.
But absolutely no althority can be found,allowing Equity to enforce
a tax levy Thrpersonal injunction on pain of punishment by contempt A
proceedings. If such were the caseany class of persons could be
put in jail at the wish of the legislatureby levying a heavy tax
on them,and on their refusal commanding an Equity Court to put them
in jail by contempt proceedings.
The question,whether the legislature can declare a thing to be a
nuisancewhether in fact it is or is not suchis not up for dis-
eussion in the present caseas the New York Liquor Tax law does
not,in any of its provisionsdeclare sales without a license to be
a nuisance. But if anyone who pays th fee may sell,then the
mere failure to pay such fee is not of itself a nuisance. The
sale of liquor without paying a license fee is not different -in
fact from the sale after paying it. The fact may bethat the
mariner of the sale of liquor by the one who has paid the tak may
be more of a nuisance than the mere sale without such payment.
The facts in both cases are absolutely identicalwith the exception
of the payment of the fee. And how the mere failure to pay the
stipulated sum of money can be a nuisance is beyond ordinary com-
p,r ehensi on.
If such sale is not a nuisance; and we fail to see how it can be,
when it is not so in fact,and the legislature has not declared it
so (even if it has such powerwhich is doubtful) then the legis-
lature has not the authority to direct an issue to be tried in an
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equity court.
The act is one which is,and akways has beenregarded as criminal in
its nature,and therefore equity has not jurisdiction to enjoin,un-
less there be great or irreparable:: harm threateningwhich cannot
be compensated by damages. The ,remedy by injunction derives its
Aalutory effects fromni power of prohibiting future acts. But
if an injunction would prohibit future sales,by fear of punishment;
an indictment would prohibit them far more fully,by putting it
beyond the power of the defendant to sell at ,all. The legal ac-
tion is far speedier and more nearly final in its results han an
application for injunction. In fact we find there is absolutely
no ground for equitable jurisdiction,but the arbitrary will of the
legislature. If the full rights of the defendant,as secured in
the Constitution,could be had in an equity court,then it wuld
take cognizancein the discretion of the legislature. But the
legislature has not the pcwer,to indirectly cut off a constitu-
tion&l guaranty by directly transferring a legal action into an
equity court,and thus cutting off the right of trial by jury.
"The proposition that remedies may be altered by the legislature,
is subject to the. supreme qualification that no constitutional
right can be infringed by any alteration of remedies" (a)
The great rise and expansion of late of such legislation as
section "29" of the "Raines" ... law, is due in no slight degree to th~e
decision of the United States in the case of In re Debs(b). As
the outcome of the doctrine there laid down may be far reaching in
(a) King v Hopkins,57 N.H.334 p.353.
(b) 158 U.S.564.
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its effects,it may be well to discu6 someeof the principles and
reasoning therein set forth.
A man may lawfully quit work whenever he pleases,and the reason or
object for which he quits is a purely private matter.
All the men in a certain employment may simultaneously quit work,
and remain away until their demands are satisfied.
If there be no combination among them,but they merely stop work,
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then their act is lawful. If,however,they form a combinationand
by their united force conspire to compel acquiescehce in their
wishes,then their act is unlawful. Not the act of quitting work,
but the act of combining and conspiring.
Men may endeavor to influence others to quit work by argument,or
other means,but cannot go so far as to use forcefraud,intimi-
dation,or threats.
In the "Debs" case,the United States Court took jurisdiction
because the acts complained of were interfering with interstate
conmerce and obstructing the mails. But the remedy sought was by
injunction. The ground shown for equitable jurisdiction was that
the acts of the defendant constituted a public ntisance. To
grant an injunction in such a case it must be shown that some
itreparable injury was threatened,or the public health imperilled.
The facts,on which the order of injunction was ased,were stated
as follows: "The vast interests involved,not merely of the city
of Chicago and the State of Illinois,but of all the states,and the
general confusion into which interstate commerce was thrown; the
forcible interference with that commerce; the attempted exercise
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by individuals of powers belonging only to governmentand the
threatened continuance of suda invasions of public right,presented
a condition of affairs,which called for the fullest exercise of
all the powers of the courts"
It requires some little stretch of imagination to perceive iii the
foregoing factsany results differing from those which usually
follow the commission of crimes against the public. The act of
a train robber in stopping a train,produces the same results; the
difference in damage being of degree merely. But it would lardly
be contested that he could be enjoined in equity. The act which
caused the damage was the combination,not Debs. It was the men's
united action which caused the "tie up" of the railroads,not the
mere order of Debs. If t1ere was any public nuisance,the com-
bination and conspiracy alone was the nuisance,and the act of Debs
was the purely criminal one of instigating a nuisance. The pun-
ishment of such an act had always been an indictment,and it should
have been so in this case.
In his opinion (p.581) Judge Brewer quotes the Federal guaranty
of "jury trial in all criminal cases,except impeachmentin the
state where the crime was committed. Fe then goes on to say:If
all the inhabitants of the state,or even a great body of them,
should combine to obstruct interstate cormarce or the transpor-
tation of the rails,prosecutions for such offences,haa in such a
community,would be~doomed in advance to failure.
This is declarinlg,that as juries might be swayed by popular
feeling,in certain cases,therefore they should not be allowed to
hear such cases. Thus a single judge deprives a person of a
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cOlstitutional right,because he fears the enforcing power will not
do its duty. The jury has heretofore been found the bulwark
aga.inst the arbitrary power of the government. The people have
declared that it shall comtinue so to be. Whenever the time comes
that the jury is found incapable of performing its functionsthe p
people will make such changes as they see fit. Until that time
comes the jury remains supreme in its own sphereand it lies not
with any judgehowever eminent,to ta.ke a proper case from themon
the ground that they might,being swayed by popular feelingdis-
charge the prisoner. The people in securing the trial by jury,
adopted it faults as well as benefitsand no judge has the right
to speculate whether,in a given case,the faults outweigh the bene-
fits,and on the outcome of his speculationsto arbitrarily deptive
the culprit of the right of a jury trial.
The vital point of the whole case,and the reason why equity assum-
ed jurisdictionwas because it was feared the jurors would not do
their duty,being swayed by popular feeling. But this was the very
argument advanced against the right of free verdict in the early
English cases.
In the case of Sir Nicholas Thockmorton,tried in 1554(a),the
judge sentenced the jury to jail for acquitting the prisoner. But
putting a jury in jail after doing what they thought their duty,
is not as bad as depriving them entirely of the chance to do their
duty.(
(a) 1st of Mary.
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The old case of William Penn has a strange analogy to the
"Debs" case. Penn was indicted in 1670 (22 Chas.II) for having
with divers other personsunlawfully and tumultuously,congregated
themselves in Gracechurch Street,London" The indictment also set
forth that Pennin the open street,"did preach and speak to persons
in the street assembled,by reason whereof a great concourse and
tumult of people,a long time did remain and continue in contempt
of the king and his law,and to the great terror and disturbance of
many of his liege people and subjects Penn was a Quakerand his
speech to the people was distasteful to the government,as that
class were not in favor at the time. He was tried,and the jury
brought in a verdict of "not guilty",against the direction of the
judge. They were each fined and sent to "Newgate" for non-payment
They were subsequently released on a writ of habeas corpus return-
able in the Court of Common Pleas.
The defendant in the case shortly afterwatds left Englaid,and
founded the second largest stateand the third largest city,in our
land. The city in which the "liberty bell" first tolled the
birth of the Union. But were Penn now in Chicago and caused " a
great concourse afd tumult of people to assemble and temain,in
contempt of the law'he would be enjoined by our courts,arx then
being guilty of contempt thereof,would be su mmarily put in jail.
He would not be allowed a trial by jury,as su ch~a prosecution would
on account of public opinion,"be doomed in advance to failure.
It seems highly impertinent to criticise the reasoning of a judge
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of our highest tribunal,but it has never before been asserted as a
reason for taking a case into equitythat the legal remedy was
inadequate,because of an inherent defect in the jury system.
The decision in this case caused a widespread feeling of dissatis-
faction among the laboring classes 7  It seems to them,the Court
held that a combination of workingmen,to cause an increase of
wages (a benefit to the many,and detriment to by few),or to protect
the rights of their weakerrbretheren,is a conspiracy,a crimea tort
a nuisance; in fact,everything wrongso that it could be attacked
from all sides;-while combinations of "Uoal Barons",to raise the
price of coal to the many to benefit themselves; "Pools" of railway
"Magnates" to increase rates to the travelling public; combinations
of oil "Kings",to tax an increase of the poor man's day; in truth,
all combinations of capital increase and grow stronger with never
a hindrance from the courts. It seems strange to them that such
things should be so; it may be remarked,incidentallythat their
bewilderment is said to be shared by many who claim some insight
into the "sternal fitness of things".
It was laid down Denio,C.J.,(a) that oftences under the liquor
laws,were punishable only after a jury trialat the time of the
adoption of the constitution,and a law directing them to be tried
before a 6ourt of Special Sessions,does away with that right and
is void.
Although the constitution of 1870 grants Courts of Special Sessions
jurisdiction in cases of misdemeanor,ini the discretion of the legis-
lature,it does not,i facto,allow an Equity court to take
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cognizance of such misdemeanors.
The opinion by Judge Field in Carleton v Rugg(a),is very per-
tinent to the matter in hand,and applies diredtly go a state of
affairs arising under section "f29?? of the "Raines" law.
" The Massachusetts statute was not paied for the abatement of
a nuisance,by destroying or changing the character of tangible
property,or by removing obstructions to the exercise of a public
right. Its purpose was,I think,to prevent the illegal sale of
intoxicating liqu~r,by punishing by fine or imprisonmentor both,
without limitin the discretion of the courtany person who sells,
or keeps such-liquors for sale,after he has been enjoined by the
court. The prevention of crire,by the punishment of persons
found guilty of an offence against a general law,is aimed at. The
legislature cannot do indirectly what it cannot ido directly; it
cannot change the nature of things,by affixing to them new names.
If the legislatureby statutecan authorize a court,in a public
prosecutionto enjoin any person from illegally keeping or selling
intoxicating liquorsin any specified place within the Ceommonwealt
why can it not authorize a court to enjoin any person from illeg-
ally keeping or selling intoxicating liquors axywhere within the
Commonwealth ? (This is precisely what is done under section
"29" of the New York Liquor Tax LawJ And if this can be dome,
why can it not authorize a court at the suit of the Commonwealth,
to enjoin any person,from doing any illegal or criminal act ,any-
where within the Comrnonwealth,and so try without a jury,any person
so enjoined on a charge of having violated the injunction, and to
(a) 149 Mass.550.
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punish him by fine and imprisonmentwithout limit,if the court
find him guilty ?.........If this jurisdiction were confined to
crimes having some direct relation to a particular buildingplace,
or temement,the number of such crimes is large,and ail crimes have
some relation to place,as they must be committed somewhere.
It was not the intention of the constitution that persons should
be punished for viilating general laws by proceedings in Equity,
or by a Court acting without a jury,and subject to no limitation
on its power to fine and imprison,except its own discretion. The
safeguards of the common law were carefully secured by the Declar-
ation of Rights,both in public prosecutions,and in private suits,
'except in cases where it has heretofore been otherwise used and
practiced! This is not such a caseand the only thing novel
about it is the proedure. Statutes against illegally selling ,
or keeping for sale intoxicating liquors,from earliest timeshave
been enforced by criminal complaints or indictments,or by penal
actions. Such statutes were never enforced in Equity anywhere
when the Constitution was adopted. I think the statute under
which the present proceedings were brought,is inconsistent with
Article XII of the Declaration of Rights"
In the same case Knowlton J.,states that there is a difference
between restraining the place of sale and the act of selling. The
former being a nuisance,and the latter a criminal act pure and
simple,and not subject to equitable cognizance. "It would be an
anomalous proceeding,for a court to enjoin a defendant from comm-
itting the crime of larceny, or of selling liquor,withW a view to
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punish as disobedience of the injunctionand contempt of court,the
same act which was before punishable as a crime. If that muld be
donean accused person through a mere change of form in the pro-
ceedings,might be punished for a crime without a trial by juryand
in violation of both the Federal and State Constitutions"
CONCLUSION. It seems,therefore,that section "29" of the New York
Liquor Tax Law is merely a piece of legislative circumlocution,
adopted by the legislature to expedite conviction under the Liquor
Tax Law. Undoubtedlya speedy trial is a much desired objectand
the efforts of the legislature to aid this end are appreciated; but
the provisions of the Constitution are superior to all theories or
designs of the legislature,and must not be contravened.
For the reasons Ie-reinbefore set forthwe think section "29"
of the New York Liquor Tax Law is in conflict with Article I Section
2 of the New York Constitution.
